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PART2 
The Banking Act of 1994 
Through its various sections, the Bank-
ing Act, 1994 assigns powers and respon-
sibilities not to one single authority, but 
to a number of different organs and enti-
ties. For the purposes of this article, it 
shall be useful to list them and to briefly 
consider their respective functions: 
(a) The "Competent Authority" appointed 
in terms of section 3 (2) which as one 
would expect has been assigned the 
major part of the regulatory respon-
sibilities, particularly the licensing and 
authorisation powers. 
(b) The Central Bank of Malta, which 
has retained a number of 
interventionary powers some of which 
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are of direct relevance to our present 
subject. 
(c) The Joint Banking Committee which 
has been entrusted with the formula-
tion of policies governing bank regu-
lation and supervise and with moni-
toring the "soundness of the banking sys-
tem" (section 27). 
(d) the Minister of Finance to whom a 
number of powers are assigned under 
this Act, and who is indeed expected 
"to exercise the powers conferred upon 
him by this Act to ensure compliance with 
the provisions of this Act ... " (section 3). 
The Minister nominates the Compe-
tent Authority and is authorised to 
issue regulations on a number of mat-
ters. 
(e) The Financial Services Tribunal 
which has competence for hearing ap-
peals from certain decisions taken by 
the Competent Authority. Section 10 
establishes the composition, compe-
tence and the procedure of this tribu-
nal. 
The Central Bank has filled the role of 
competent authority from the date that the 
Banking Act of 1994 was brought into 
force. (see Legal Notice 166 of 1994 is-
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sued by the Minister ofFinance). Juanita 
Bencini's paper "Banks in Malta -some 
thorny issues" carried in the last issue of 
this journal has already remarked on cer-
tain anomalous situations that this inte-
gration of the Central Bank with the com-
petent authority may give rise to. It is rel-
evant for the purpose of this present ex-
ercise to keep a clear conceptual distinc-
tion between the Central Bank and the 
competent authority. 
This distinction did not arise in the pre-
vious Banking Act of 1970, where most 
of the regulatory powers had been vested 
in the Minister of Finance. In a number 
of cases the Minister was empowered to 
take certain action but in most cases only 
after consultation with the Central Bank 
of Malta. Under section 8 of the Act the 
Minister had the authority to suspend or 
revoke a banking licence in a number of 
situations including insolvency. Under 
section 18, the Minister after consulting 
the Central Bank could adopt a number 
of measures against a bank which is op-
erating" in a manner detrimental to the in-
terests of its depositors or creditors, or ... has 
inszif.Jicient assets to cover its liabilities, or. .. is 
likely to become unable to meet its obliga-
tions or is about to suspend payment, or 
... that it has become unable to meet its obli-
gations or has suspended payment ... . ". Fol-
lowing the adoption of the Banking Act 
of 1994, the 1970 Act now only applies 
to offshore banks registered in terms of 
the Malta Financial Services Centre Act 
subject to a few modifications introduced 
in the latter Act. 
It is against this backdrop that we may 
now proceed to consider the unfortunate 
scenario of a bank duly licensed under the 
Banking Act, 1994 ending up in severe 
distress, whether financial or otherwise. 
In such a circumstance, both the Central 
Bank and the competent authority have 
powers to intervene. Intervention may 
occur at any of two distinct levels. First, 
the competent authority (not the Cen-
tral Bank as such) may choose to take 
action in relation to the operator's licence. 
This would appear logical since it is the 
competent authority which issued the li-
cence in the first place. Section 9 em-
powers the competent authority to restrict 
or to revoke a bank licence in a number 
of defined circumstances, including where 
a bank is unable to "to meet its obligations" 
or "can no longer be relied upon to meet its 
obligations towards depositors and creditors". 
Other grounds include lack of sufficient 
assets to cover the bank's liabilities, sus-
pension or imminent suspension of its 
payments, or where "the Competent Au-
thority considers that, by reason of the man-
ner in which the bank is conducting or pro-
posing to conduct its affairs, or for any other 
reason, the interests of the depositors or the 
bank are threatened.". Any action taken 
by the competent authority by virtue of 
section 9 may be subjected to an appeal 
by the licence-holder to the Financial 
Services Tribunal established in terms of 
section 10 of the Act. In most cases, the 
submission of an appeal would not have 
the effect of suspending the operation of 
the decision of the competent authority. 
A second level of intervention is offered 
by section 29, which is a rather lengthy 
and elaborate section. Here the Act es-
tablishes a radically different and alter-
native approach, where the Central Bank 
(in its own right now, not as competent 
authority) may itself take the initiative 
and take direct action against the dis-
tressed bank - irrespective, it would 
seem, of the competent authority. The 
Central Bank may put into place one or 
more of the remedial measures listed in 
section 29, namely: 
(a) it may require the bank to wind up its 
business; 
(b) it may appoint a competent person to 
act as liquidator for the purposes of 
winding up the bank's affairs; 
(c) it may appoint "a competent person to 
take charge of the bank's assets or any 
portion of them for the purpose of safe-
guarding the interests of depositors"; 
(d) it may appoint "a competent person to 
assume control of the business of the 
bank and either to carry on that busi-
ness or to carry out suchother function or 
functions in respect of such business, or 
part thereof, as the Central Bank may 
direct.". 
In the last two cases, the person appointed 
by the Central Bank takes full control of 
the assets or business and assumes all the 
"powers, functions and duties .... exercisable 
by the company in general meeting or by the 
board of directors ... to the exclusion of any 
other person". (This formula substantially 
reproduces the wording of section 27(12) 
of the MFSC Act relating to the wind-
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ing-up of offshore companies. This point 
has been briefly considered in the Part I 
of this paper.) Section 28 adds that the 
person nominated by the Central Bank 
replaces any other person who may 
have been appointed to take over the 
company's assets or business under any 
other law. Presumably this wording 
includes a liquidator who may have 
earlier been appointed in terms of the 
winding-up provisions of the Compa-
nies Act. 
There are other features worthy of note 
in section 29: 
(1) The Central Bank may "require the 
Competent Authority" to revoke or re-
strict the bank's licence in accordance 
with section 9. This rather peculiar 
power represents a rather inelegant 
way of defining inter-institutional 
collaboration and belittles the entity 
operating as competent authority. It 
would appear rather unusual and rare 
to find one authority imposing itself 
on another to the point where it can 
presume to instruct it to take a spe-
cific course of action. 
(2) Again, similar to the position under 
the Investment Services Act, this sec-
tion makes no specific reference to the 
rules of company legislation. We find 
no reference to the important provi-
sions in the Companies Act which 
provide for the possibility of having a 
company wound up by the Court for 
inability to pay its debts (section 
214(2)(a)(ii)), or for grounds of suffi-
cient gravity (section 214 (2)(b)(iii)). 
Nor is there any reference to the 
power of the Registrar of Companies 
to file a winding up application where 
it appears to him "expedient and in the 
public interest that a company should be 
dissolved and wound up". From this 
brief analysis it seems to result that 
the relevant rules regarding the wind-
ing up of banking companies which 
arise under the Banking Act and the 
Companies Act are inadequately 
streamlined. It may be instructive to 
note that in a different context, spe-
cific reference to the Companies Act 
is made in section 31(11) of the Bank-
ing Act which deals with the appoint-
ment and responsibilities of auditors. 
This section states that "in so far as 
the provisions of this section are incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Com-
panies Act, 1995, the provisions of this 
section shall prevail and the provisions 
of the said Act shall, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, not apply to 
banks."). 
(3) There is no possibility of appeal to 
the Financial Services Tribunal 
from any action taken by the Cen-
tral Bank under section 29. 
As a general comment, it may be sug-
gested that sections 9 and 29 seem not 
to exist all that well together, and that 
they may cause untidy duplication. The 
two sections cover similar ground, en-
trust two distinct statutory entities with 
authority to intervene to resolve one 
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factual set of circumstances - a bank 
in severe distress - and each of these 
entities can react in a different man-
ner. Additionally, the Act seems rather 
inconsistent in withholding the avail-
ability of an appeal to the Tribunal from 
certain important decisions effecting a 
licence-holder taken by the Central 
Bank under section 29. 
It would be useful at this juncture to 
refer briefly to the position under the 
English Banking Act of 1987 which 
seems to have served as a model for a 
number of provisions of our 1994 Act. 
Does the English Act present a similar 
inconsistency? The answer is in the 
negative. The 1987 Act confers on the 
Bank of England the authority to take 
direct action against a bank's licence, 
in which case an appeal would be pos-
sible to the special tribunal set up and 
regulated by sections 27 to 31 of that 
Act. This procedure is very similar to 
that established under section 9 and 10 
of our Banking Act. On the other 
hand, where the Bank of England de-
cides that a bank should be wound up, 
its action is limited to presenting ape-
tition for winding up before the ordi-
nary courts under the ordinary stand-
ard company legislation procedure. 
The Bank of England (whose regula-
tory authority in banking supervision 
is in the course of being assigned to the 
new Financial Services Authority) has 
no direct statutory power to appoint a 
controller or a liquidator itself. 
The Financial Institutions 
Act, 1994 
The remarks made in relation to our 
1994 Banking Act apply in almost 
equal measure to the Financial Insti-
tutions Act of 1994. This should come 
as no surprise seeing that this Act was 
consciously drafted as an edited version 
of the Banking Act, which had already 
been presented to Parliament a short 
time earlier. In the Financial Institu-
tions Act, sections 6 and 17 mirror sec-
tions 9 and 29 of the Banking Act with 
the same inconsistent approach to the 
Financial Services Tribunal and a 
rather clumsily sketched interaction 
between the competent authority and 
the Central Bank. 
EATURE 
The Controlled Companies 
(Procedure for Liquidation) 
Act, 1995 
Finally, a few words concerning the Con-
trolled Companies (Procedure for Liq-
uidation) Act of 1995, a short piece of 
legislation that merits a brief mention. 
This recent Act has a very restricted ap-
plication as it only affects banks in respect 
of which the Central Bank has appointed 
a controller and has in addition made 
what is termed as "an order for liquidation" 
(section 3). Although there is no specific 
reference to the BICAL case, there can 
be no doubt that his Act was primarily 
intended to resolve certain long standing 
issues connected to the affairs of the 
BICAL bank. Proof of this is amply 
proved by the parliamentary debate on 
the bill. The BICAL qualifies as a con-
trolled company for the purposes of this 
Act, and it is indeed relevant to note 
that this BICAL's banking licence has 
never actually been revoked but merely 
suspended. The bank has been under 
a Central Bank-appointed controller 
since 1973. 
For reasons of space, I shall here limit 
myself to three further remarks. First, the 
provisions of this Act seem unconcerned 
with what has so far been a clear concep-
tual and practical distinction between the 
role of a controller and that of a liquida-
tor. This distinction is drawn in the two 
Banking Acts of 1970 and 1994. The 
decision to appoint a controller, rather 
than a liquidator, indicates that the bank 
is being retained as a going concern con-
trolled by the Central Bank appointee, 
with its operating licence kept in force. 
This 1995 Act now implies that the con-
troller may also liquidate the bank. Sec-
ondly, contrary to what the Controlled 
Companies (Procedure for Liquidation) 
Act may suggest, the Banking Act of1994 
does not make provision for the issue of a 
liquidation order while the controller re-
mains in office. Thirdly, this Act has in-
troduced a remarkable blanket exemption 
in favour of any controller appointed un-
der the Banking Act, with retrospective 
effect to the date of their appointment. 
The first BICAL controller was ap-
pointed in the early seventies. To the 
writer's knowledge, nothing similar to this 
provision is found under any other law in 
Malta. 
The Malta Stock 
Exchange Act of 1990 
This Act was passed in 1990. It estab-
lished the Malta Stock Exchange and as-
signed to the Council of the Malta Stock 
Exchange the statutory responsibility for 
licensing stockbrokers and for authoris-
ing the listing of securities and other in-
struments on the Malta Stock Exchange. 
The Act contained a very clear statement 
that where its provisions or bye-laws are 
inconsistent with the Companies Act, the 
former were to prevail. The Act provides 
for the issue of licences to stockbrokers 
and for the restriction or cancellation of 
such licences. 
Insofar as our present topic is concerned, 
the Council is not assigned any special 
powers to appoint controllers or liquida-
tors, or to order the winding up of a li-
cence-holder's affairs. Similarly, in respect 
of company securities listed on the Ex-
change, bye-law 6.01.12 which deals with 
the possibility of a suspension or cancel-
lation of a listing (bye-law), makes no ref-
erence to the scenario of financial diffi-
culties or insolvency. This bye-law as-
signs to a Listing Committee a broad 
power to order the suspension or cancel-
lation of a listing "as it thinks fit ... to pro-
tect investors and to ensure an orderly mar-
ket'. Such action does not bring about 
the dissolution of the listed company, 
which would therefore remain regulated 
by the Companies Act. 
An important feature which deserves 
mention here is the compensation fund, 
established in pursuance of section 12 of 
the Act, and regulated in detail by Chap-
ter 7 of the bye-laws. Section 12 of the 
Malta Stock Exchange Act establishes 
this fund in order to provide a cushion 
"in the event of financial difficulties of any 
member to meet his obligations towards the 
investing public.". The fund therefore only 
concerns the authorised stockbroking 
firms and does not apply to listed com-
panies or other entities. The unfortunate 
problem with the Chapter 7 bye-laws is 
that they seem to go beyond the inten-
tions of section 12, their enabling section. 
This section refers exclusively to a sce-
nario of"jinancial difficulties", whereas the 
bye-laws also provide for the possibility 
of claiming compensation in the event of 
acts like fraud, negligence, omission and 
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breach of professional duty, which may 
not necessarily be connected to insol-
vency. 
T heN ew Insurance Legislation 
A couple of short points shall be made in 
respect of the two new pieces of insur-
ance legislation which are at the time of 
writing undergoing their final scrutiny at 
committee stage in Parliament. The two 
bills are the Insurance Business Act and 
the Insurance Brokers and Other Inter-
mediaries Act. These shall completely 
replace the current Insurance Business 
Act that had been adopted in 1981 as the 
first comprehensive law on insurance in 
Malta. It may be immediately high-
lighted that many of the structures 
adopted in the new insurance legislation 
are modelled on the pattern introduced 
in the Investment Services Act and the 
Banking Act of 1994. These structures 
include the concept of "competent au-
thority" and the appeal mechanism to the 
Financial Services Tribunal. 
Of particular interest to our present ex-
ercise is the new Insurance Business Act. 
The main relevant provisions of the new 
Act would appear to be sections 25 to 28 
and sections 41 to 42. Section 25 lists a 
number of circumstances where an oper-
ating authorisation issued by the compe-
tent authority would suffer what is termed 
as "automatic revocation". One of these 
circumstances is where the authorised 
company "is declared bankrupt or goes into 
liquidation .... or is otherwise dissolved.". 
Section 26 authorises the competent au-
thority to suspend or revoke an authori-
sation in a number of instances which 
include where a company is "likely to be-
come unable to meet its obligations, or can 
no longer be relied upon to fulfill or satisfY 
its obligations towards insureds, policyhold-
ers, creditors or other interested persons.". 
Section 28 allows the competent author-
ity to require a company to dissolve and 
wind up its business and to appoint a liq-
uidator. As we have already seen when 
considering the Banking Act, the liqui-
dator appointed under this section would 
take over the company's affairs "to the ex-
clusion of any other person". 
"The dissolution and winding up of author-
ised companies" is the marginal note which 
EA T URE 
A brief note on compensation schemes 
No discussion concerning the insolvency of a licensed operator in the financial services field 
is complete without at least a brief consideration of what investor and depositor compensa-
tion schemes may be available under legislation or in terms of self-regulating private ar-
rangements. The compensation fund established by the Malta Stock Exchange Act of 1990 
and the Security Fund established under the Insurance Business Act of 1981 are the only 
two compensation funds in operation in Maltese financial services legislation. 
Neither the of two Banking Acts of 1970 and 1994 make any reference to compensation 
funds, while the Investment Services Act gives authority to the Minister, acting on the advice 
of the competent authority, to "establish schemes or make arrangements for the compensa-
tion of investors ... where .. . the holders of a .. licence .. are unable to satisfy claims in respect 
of any civil liability incurred by them". 
Part XI of the new Insurance Business Act currently in its last stages of parliamentary de-
bate, sets up a Protection and Compensation Fund which is intended to replace the current 
Security Fund. The new, more elaborately named Fund, whose objectives mirror those of 
the Security Fund shall not be restricted to insolvency situations, but shall extend also to 
certain traffic-related events including hit-and-run incidents. 
introduces the various provisions of sec-
tion 41. This section makes explicit ref-
erence to the winding up provisions of the 
Companies Act The section requires the 
application of the winding up rules con-
tained in the Companies Act to author-
ised companies which decide to resolve 
and wind up their affairs. Where the 
local operation is a branch of a foreign 
company, the winding up shall proceed 
on the basis of the company law rules 
regulating the head office of the foreign 
company. A number of other rules are 
being introduced in this section in order 
to better protect the interests of Maltese 
creditors and policyholders. 
A striking innovation is the rule in sec-
tion 48 that prohibits long term life busi-
ness companies from winding up their af-
fairs under the Companies Act rules re-
lating to voluntary winding up. This im-
plies that the winding up of such compa-
nies may only be carried out by the proc-
ess described as winding up by the Court, 
a process which is amply dealt with in the 
1995 Act and which offers much more 
protection to creditors, including poli-
cyholders. 
The Cooperative 
Societies Act of 1978 
This paper would not be complete with-
out a few words on the law which regu-
lates cooperative societies. The rules of 
company law do not apply to Coopera-
tives. Although actually quite similar to 
companies in several respects, these busi-
ness organisations are regulated by a dis-
tinct special law passed in 1978, a law 
which perhaps has not received sufficient 
attention. Cooperatives share with com-
panies a number of features, whereas a 
number of provisions are unique to co-
operatives legislation. One of the most 
remarkable elements of the Cooperatives 
Act is the extensive range of functions and 
powers assigned to the Cooperatives 
Board. The Board is a regulatory body 
established by the Act to administer the 
provisions of the Act and to promote the 
setting up of and to license and supervise 
cooperatives in Malta. The Board enjoys 
a separate legal personality and operates 
with the relative autonomy devised for it 
under the Act. The law expects the Co-
operative Board to play what may be de-
scribed as an intrusive role and the ex-
tent of its functions is probably nowhere 
more dramatically illustrated than in the 
provisions dealing with the dissolution 
and winding-up of cooperatives. Practi-
cally every step in the dissolution and 
winding-up process is subjected to pos-
sible intervention by the Board. 
The Cooperative Societies Act contem-
plates two broad methods of bringing 
about the termination of a cooperative's 
activity and existence: 
(1) by the voluntary decision of the re-
quired majority of the members; 
(2) by order of the Board following the 
holding of an inquiry. 
In both eventualities the final say rests 
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with the Board, in view of the statement 
contained in section 101 that no coop-
erative may be dissolved "save by an order 
of the Cooperatives Board'. In terms of 
Section 97, the Cooperatives Board may, 
"on its own motion", hold an inquiry into 
the working or financial condition of a 
society. If as a result of the inquiry, the 
Board in its discretion "is of the opinion 
that such society ought to be wound up", the 
Board may dissolve the society and ap-
point a liquidator. 
The functions and duties of a liquidator 
of a cooperative society are found listed 
in section 102. Subsection (5), for in-
stance, requires a liquidator to submit to 
the Cooperatives Board a progress report 
on the winding up every three months. 
The following section (section 103) after 
emphatically stating that "A liquidator shall 
exercise his powers subject to the control and 
supervision of the Board.", lays down an 
endless list of specific powers that the 
Board may exercise during the winding 
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up process. To mention but a few, the 
Board may "rescind or vary" any decision 
taken by the liquidator, it may restrict his 
powers and it may decide to remove and 
replace him, and it may take control of 
all the assets and records of the coopera-
tive being wound up. 
It would appear that the intervention of 
the Board in this area borders on exag-
geration and is a feature of the Act which 
one would certainly not like to see trans-
ported into our companies legislation. 
Concluding Remark 
This paper has attempted to focus on cer-
tain aspects of the role which statutory 
bodies, created by law to regulate and su-
pervise particular sectors of regulated 
business, are being expected to play. 
Hopefully, this brief overview has suffi-
ciently highlighted the extent of the in-
volvement of the various regulatory bod-
ies in the areas of insolvency and wind-
ing up, areas such bodies clearly cannot 
afford to be absent from completely. 
However, this exercise may have indicated 
that the legal provisions governing the 
mode and extent of the involvement by 
the regulatory bodies often vary consid-
erably; in some places these provisions 
disclose a few inconsistencies and grey 
areas. It would therefore seem that a 
greater effort is needed to find the right 
balance between the different interests at 
play and to promote more harmonious co-
existence between the various laws and 
statutory bodies involved. 
The writer is the Director in charge of 
legal affairs at the Malta Financial 
Services Centre and a lecturer on financial 
services legislation at the University of 
M alta. The views expressed in this article 
are entirely his own and do not reflect 
any official position on any of the subjects 
raised Part I of this article appeared 
in the last issue ofThe Accountant. 
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